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Abstract
We evaluate the relative importance of aggregate labor productivity versus income taxes and
social contributions for tax compliance in an economy with a large degree of informality. Em-
pirical evidence points out that tax evasion in Europe happens through partially concealing
wages and profits in formally registered enterprises. To this end, we build a model in which
employer-employee pairs of heterogeneous productive capacities make joint decisions on the
degree of tax evasion. The quantitative model is used to analyze the case of Bulgaria which
has the largest informal economy in Europe and underwent a number of important tax reforms
over the period 2000-2014, including the introduction of a flat income tax in 2008. The estima-
tion strategy relies on matching the empirical series for the size of the informal economy and
other aggregate outcomes for 2000-2014. Our counterfactual experiments show that the most
important factor for the changing size of the informal economy is labor productivity, which
accounts for more than 75% of the change. The variation in corporate income tax accounts
for the rest. We find that the 2008 flat tax reform did not play any visible role in coping with
informality.
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1 Introduction
Informal economic activity is a pervasive phenomenon worldwide.1 Moreover, informal produc-
tion is present not only in developing countries but also in emerging and developed economies.
Informality is well-spread in Eastern and Southern Europe and reaches its highest in Bulgaria
where the informal production amounts to a third of officially reported GDP in the late 2000s, as
shown in Figure 1a.2
Figure 1: Economic Informality in Europe, 2007-2013
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(d) Envelope Wages (% of Income)
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Notes: The size of the informal economy is taken from Schneider and Enste (2013). The share of employees with no formal contracts is derived
from the 2013 Eurobarometer survey (Special Eurobarometer 402). The share of workers with envelope wages and the share of income received in
envelope wages are derived from 2007-2013 Eurobarometer surveys (Special Eurobarometer 284 and 402). A detailed description of the data used
in all figures and tables is presented in Appendices A.1 and A.2.
1We follow the definition of informal economic activity of the OECD: “all legal production activities that are
deliberately concealed from public authorities for the following kind of reasons: to avoid payment of income, value
added or other taxes; to avoid payment of social security contributions; to avoid having to meet certain legal standards
such as minimum wages, maximum hours, safety or health standards, etc.” Therefore, criminal activities and unpaid
work are not considered as part of the informal economy.
2This fact is confirmed by both the estimates of Schneider and Enste (2013) which we utilize in the paper and
by a recent report on the size of the shadow economy across the globe by the Association of Chartered Certified
Accountants (ACCA 2017).
1
According to the 2013 World Bank Enterprise Survey almost all firms in Europe, and in par-
ticular in Bulgaria, are officially registered.3 These firms conceal part of their economic activity
to avoid paying taxes and social contributions. However, the number of their employees is not un-
derreported. The 2013 Eurobarometer survey on undeclared work confirms this statement. Figure
1b presents the share of employees with no formal contracts. The average share across Europe is
2%, however, in Bulgaria it is 0%. Informal production, in this context, amounts to misreporting
wages and profits to the tax authorities. Williams (2008), among others, emphasizes the pervasive
practice of firms reporting lower official wages and compensating their employees with informal
payments, known as “envelope wages”. The share of workers with envelope wages is almost at
its peak in Bulgaria at 10% according to the Eurobarometer surveys in 2007-2013 (see Figure 1c).
Only Romania has a higher share of 15%. The followers in the European ranking are Hungary,
Italy and Spain with about 5-7%. Note that the average share of workers with envelope wages
for the European Union is 4% in 2007-2013. Finally, the reported fraction of income received in
envelope wages in Bulgaria of 43% is also at the high end of the distribution (see Figure 1d). In the
Eurobarometer surveys, workers self-report whether they receive informal payments or not. These
results are likely to underestimate the occurrence of envelope wage practices since respondents are
usually not comfortable to confess to tax evasion. Therefore, the numbers in Figures 1c and 1d can
be viewed as a lower bound (see Appendix A.1 for further details on envelope wages).
The Bulgarian economy underwent a number of significant changes in the last 15 years (2000-
2014). The informal economy size shrank from 37% of official GDP to 31%. At the same time
the observed aggregate labor productivity (GDP per employee) rose by around 45%. Furthermore,
several major tax reforms were implemented in this time period which reduced the average tax
burden levied on both workers and firms. The corporate income tax rate went from 32.5% in 2000
to 10% in 2008. The progressivity of the personal income tax was gradually reduced in the 2000-
2007 period and finally eliminated in 2008 when personal income taxes became proportional with
a 10% rate; see Section 2 for further details. An important motivation behind these tax reforms was
the inherent idea that lower (and less progressive) taxes would reduce the amount of informality
and tax evasion. These stylized facts suggest that the Bulgarian economy in the last two decades
can be viewed as a natural laboratory to study the determinants of the informal economic activity
and tax evasion practices related to it.
3The relevant data is further discussed in Appendix A.1.
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Our main goal in the paper is to determine the driving forces behind the observed changes in
the informal economy using Bulgaria as a case study.4 We start from the premise that envelope
wage practices are the predominant source of informal (hidden) production there. We explore
what is the role of reducing taxes and whether different taxes have a differential effect on the
informal economy. The mechanism at work is clear: when taxes are lower, tax evasion becomes
less attractive. At the same time, we control for various other factors that may influence the degree
of tax evasion such as institutional efficiency in tax collection and the aggregate productivity level
in the economy. When aggregate productivity rises, there is more income to be hidden. However,
tax evasion will rise only if the marginal benefit of hiding increases. As pointed out in the analytical
part of the paper, this happens only when the tax system is progressive. In such case, rising income
levels imply higher marginal tax rates and stronger incentives for evasion. On the other hand, a
rise in productivity may mechanically decrease the level of informality measured as the share of
official GDP. Suppose that the nominal amount of tax evasion increases little to none. However,
the GDP level increases due to the higher productivity. Then, the share of informal activity out of
GDP is to decrease.
Ultimately, disentangling the forces behind the observed decline in the size of the informal
economy in Bulgaria for the period 2000-2014 is a quantitative question. Up to this end, we build
a model suited for studying tax evasion in Bulgaria. In particular, we carefully model the preva-
lent practice of envelope wages/profits used for generating informal output and evading taxes. The
model economy is populated by a large number of islands with different productivity levels. Each
island is occupied by one-period lived employer and a worker who collaborate on the production of
a homogeneous good. Production depends on both an aggregate productivity shock which changes
over time and an island-specific productivity level. The government in the economy cannot ob-
serve the island-specific productivity on each island. This creates possibilities of tax evasion by
the productive pair. When underreporting production, the employer pays the worker an official
salary which should be at least as high as the prevailing minimum wage. The rest of the worker’s
remuneration is an unofficial undeclared salary which we dub the envelope wage. The rest of the
undeclared output is appropriated by the employer as an envelope profit.
The level of underreported production in the model is pinned down by comparing the benefits
4Following Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002), we differentiate two types of tax noncompliance: tax evasion and tax
avoidance. Tax evasion refers to the illegal misreporting of income. In contrast, tax avoidance refers to mostly legal
actions taken by individuals or firms to reduce their tax liabilities. In this paper we focus exclusively on tax evasion as
the source of informality.
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of tax evasion in terms of forgone tax and social contributions payments to its costs. Hiding output
reduces the overall production capacity of the pair. This reflects the adjustments of the production
process due to tax evasion. For instance, double accounting practices can be costly in terms of time
or concealed production may take place at night.
The quantitative implementation of the model takes as inputs the detailed tax and social contri-
bution schemes in Bulgaria for the 2000-2014 period. The parameters of the model are estimated
via a minimum distance technique. In doing so, we match the evolution of the size of the informal
economy in Bulgaria for the time period of 2000-2014. Additional time series data targets utilized
in the estimation are the observed aggregate labor productivity and average wages. Utilizing them,
the model recovers the evolution of true productivity and workers remuneration over time. To the
best of our knowledge, this is one of the few novel quantitative works on tax evasion in a Euro-
pean setting, that captures the prevailing tax evasion practices in Europe, and thus stands in sharp
contrast with respect to the vast literature focusing on developing countries.
The performed quantitative experiments point out that the rise of productivity over the period
is the main driver behind the declining informality. If we fix taxes to their 2000 level but let pro-
ductivity rise as predicted by the baseline model, then this counterfactual economy generates more
than 75% of the decline in informality observed in the baseline version. Tax policy is important too
but plays a secondary role. Feeding observed tax and social contributions changes over the period
into the model while fixing productivity to its 2000 level accounts for around 35% of the change in
informality observed in the baseline economy. Among the taxes considered in the model, the most
important determinant for the changing patterns of tax evasion is the corporate income tax. Social
contributions and personal income taxes have no effect on the evolution of the informal economy
size.
There are two main reasons why personal income tax and social contributions do not play a
significant quantitative role in our model. First, they are levied on the official wages which turn out
to be only a small fraction of production output. Therefore, falling tax rates on the workers’ income
are quantitatively much less relevant than the falling tax rates on the employers’ profits. Second, tax
evasion in the estimated economy occurs in production units which are relatively less productive.
This happens because the estimated cost of tax evasion rises sharply with productivity.5 Therefore,
5The fact that production units with higher productivity and/or size face a higher cost of evasion is confirmed by a
host of empirical evidence in European countries. Among others, using data from the Italian Revenue Agency (IRA)
Bobbio (2016) documents for Italy that firms with lower turnover evade significantly more.
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the diminishing progressivity of the personal income tax over time reduces the incentives for tax
evasion only in more productive units which do not evade much in first place.
We further validate the key implications of our quantitative analysis using additional empirical
evidence. Specifically, we test some of the implications using data on informality, tax rates and
labor productivity across countries and time and across sectors. As predicted by our structural
model, these data confirm that (i) countries with stronger productivity growth have a sharper de-
crease in informal economy and (ii) industrial sectors with lower productivity have higher level of
informality.
In a subsequent exercise, we take the model economy in 2014 and ask what are the optimal tax
schedules for personal and corporate income. The Ramsey-type problem amounts to maximizing
produced output and, therefore, minimizing tax evasion, which is the only factor that reduces
production. At the same time, the collected tax revenue is fixed to the observed levels in the
baseline model. Optimal taxation requires a mild reduction in the corporate tax and a significant
rise of the personal income tax. Also, optimal personal income taxes are proportional as observed
in the data for 2014. The exercise delivers one more important insight: the benefits of setting
optimal taxes instead of the observed ones in terms of productive efficiency are very small.
Can our analysis can be extended to other countries? Our model framework can be easily
extended to other countries where informality happens within formally registered enterprises which
offer formal wage contracts to workers and where wages and profits are partially hidden. As
explained above, this is the empirically relevant case in Europe. We outline a path of how to do
that in Section 5.1. Our findings suggest that the effects of personal income tax and/or employees’
social contributions on informality are stronger in countries where workers have more bargaining
power.
What are the policy implications of these findings? Reducing personal income tax levels and/or
progressivity would not have a slashing effect on tax evasion. Instead, our quantitative results point
out that reforming the corporate tax code can lead to lower levels of tax evasion. More importantly,
our findings emphasize that further improvements in labor productivity may be the main driver for
eradicating tax evasion. This calls for active policies aimed at product/labor market liberalization,
entry barriers removal and further investments in research and development.
The rest of the document is structured as follows. In the next Subsection 1.1, we review the
current literature and its relation to our work. Section 2 presents stylized facts about informality,
labor productivity and the specifics of the tax and social contributions system in Bulgaria. In
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section 3 we present the economic environment. Section 4 discusses the estimation strategy and
model fit. Section 5 contains the results of the counterfactual exercises, while Section 6 validates
the main quantitative results using cross-country and cross-sector data on informality and labor
productivity. Section 7 discusses optimal taxation. We provide conclusions in the last section.
1.1 Related Literature
The practice of envelope wages in Europe have been studied empirically by Williams (2008),
Williams and Padmore (2013) and Williams (2014) among others using data from the Eurobaram-
eter surveys. In an innovative empirical exercise Pelek and Uysal (2016) estimate the extent of
envelope wages in the case of Turkey combining data collected on a firm and household level.
Tonin (2011) is the first to take into account the interaction between workers and employers in the
process of tax evasion within an economic framework. Unlike us, he explores the role of minimum
wage legislation for tax evasion in the case of Hungary.
A small but growing macroeconomic literature deals with the aggregate consequences of tax
evasion. Chen (2003) incorporates tax evasion in an endogenous growth model, whereas Maffez-
zoli (2011) studies the distributional implications of income tax evasion in a heterogeneous agents
framework with uninsurable income risk. In contrast to these papers, we abstract from the dynamic
consequences of tax evasion but focus on the employer-worker joint decision to go informal. In
addition, we incorporate in our macroeconomic model a detailed representation of different taxes
which allows us to assess the relative importance of each of them for tax evasion.6
A number of macroeconomic papers apply two-sector models of formal and informal produc-
tion to emerging economies. Antunes and Cavalcanti (2007) use a general equilibrium model of
occupational choice and informality to emphasize the role of regulation costs and financial con-
tracts enforcement for cross-country differences in informality. In a similar spirit, Kuehn (2014)
outlines the role of taxes and government quality for the level and dispersion of informal activity
in OECD countries. Orsi et al. (2014) studies the determinants of the size of the informal economy
for the case of Italy. Pappa et al. (2015) show that tax evasion and corruption matter for the size of
fiscal multipliers. Joubert (2015) explores the link between informality and the design of a pension
system within a structural model, while Albrecht et al. (2009) and Meghir et al. (2015) study the
6The theoretical literature on tax evasion starts with Allingham and Sandmo (1972) who present a stylized model
of tax evasion by a risk-averse agent who faces the probability of getting caught and penalized by the tax authorities.
For a detailed summary of the existing literature, see Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002).
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interaction between informality and labor market dynamics. Koreshkova (2006) evaluates the role
of inflation as an implicit tax on the informal economy. Note that the two-sector setup used in
these papers implies that informality never takes place in formally registered firms. Therefore, this
approach is not entirely suited to study the observed envelope wage practices in Europe. Ulyssea
(2018) extends the existing literature that models informality as a binary choice introducing an
intensive margin, which implies that formal firms can hire workers “off the books”. We relate to
Ulyssea (2018) in the sense that we also focus on the intensive margin but we depart from his
analysis in two crucial aspects. First, we abstract altogether from the extensive margin, motivated
by the empirical evidence pointing out that in Europe most firms are registered.7 Second, in our
setup workers are not hired “off the books” but are paid part of their wage in cash, whenever the
employer and the worker decide to tax evade. We stress that this is the most relevant case: Figure
1b shows that the share of employees with no formal contracts is negligible in Bulgaria and is also
quite low for other European countries (with a couple of exceptions).
On the empirical side, Gorodnichenko et al. (2009) study the effects of the 2001 flat tax reforms
in Russia on tax evasion and economic activity. The reform reduced the average taxes of the rich
while leaving the tax burden for the poor unchanged. The results point out that less progressive
income taxes led to a sizable decrease in tax evasion coming from the affected affluent households.
In contrast, the flattening of the income tax does not have a dramatic effect on informality in our
estimated model. This is so, because envelope wage practices occur in relatively poor households
who are unaffected by the flat tax reform. Using tax data from a field experiment in Denmark,
Kleven et al. (2011) document that tax evasion differs greatly depending on the sources of income:
in particular, tax compliance is much lower for income that is not subject to third-party reporting,
like self-employed or business income. In our paper we abstract from the self-employed who are
not subject to third-party reporting and thus can evade.8 We focus more on salaried workers and
companies. In Bulgaria, the share of self-employed out of the total labor forced is quite low: it was
12.5% in 2014, the last year of our sample, compared to an EU average of 16.5%. Table A.3 in
Appendix A.1 shows that Eastern European countries have relatively low share of self-employed.
7The share of firms formally registred when they started operations in the country is as high as 97% in Bulgaria,
96% In Romania, 95.6% in Hungary, 98% in Poland, etc. Data on the share of formally registered firms are taken
from the 2013 World Bank Enterprise Survey. See Table A.2 in Appendix A.1 for more details. This evidence is
also surveyed in Williams (2008) who writes that “[in Eastern Europe] most undeclared work is conducted by formal
enterprises which under-report their earnings rather than by wholly undeclared enterprises”.
8A subset of the authors study this channel in Di Nola et al. (2018).
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Our approach has two main advantages over an empirically-driven analysis based on a quasi-
experimental setup. First, we can recover the parameters of the model using only time series
variations in aggregate productivity, tax rates and informal economy size. This is a huge advantage
when detailed micro-data are not available. Second, the model allows us to separate the relative
strengths of several driving forces behind informality and tax evasion. This can be done in the
quantitative framework by explicitly shutting down one or several of these driving forces at a time.
Therefore, we have a say on how important are changes in taxation versus changes in productivity
in shaping the informal economic activities. Moreover, we can distinguish the role of changing
different taxes in coping with tax evasion practices.
2 Facts and Institutional Design
The Bulgarian economy was in transition from planning to market in the 1990s. Therefore, here
we focus on the subsequent period. We start our analysis in 2000, just three years after the intro-
duction of the currency board in Bulgaria which stabilized the macroeconomic environment. In
what follows, we summarize the evolution of the Bulgarian informal economy and its potential
determinants in the period 2000-2014.
2.1 Informal Economy, Labor Productivity and Institutional Efficiency
The size of the informal economy in Bulgaria decreased by around 7 percentage points (from 37%
of the official GDP to 31%) in the period 2000-2014. Figure 2 presents this decline along with
the corresponding 45% rise in labor productivity (computed as GDP per employee) in this period.
The dotted line in 2008 marks both the start of the Great Recession, which arrived a year later in
Bulgaria, and the introduction of the flat tax personal income schedule. In the period 2008-2010
informality slightly increased, while observed productivity decreased (due to the Great Recession).
As already mentioned, one of the main goals of this paper is to disentangle the role of economic
development and productivity growth from the effects of tax reforms for the level of tax evasion
and informal production.
Figure 3 depicts four indicators of the institutional efficiency and the quality of governance in
Bulgaria in the last 15 years reported by the World Bank. The indicators for government effective-
ness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption range from -2.5 (weak governance)
8
to 2.5 (strong governance). All four measures of institutional efficiency do not change significantly
over the analyzed period. Therefore, institutions are unlikely to have a major role in accounting
for the observed decline of informality.
Figure 2: Size of Informal Economy and Labor Productivity
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Notes: The size of the informal economy is taken from Schneider and Enste (2013) and Schneider (2015). The average labor productivity is taken
from the International Labor Organization Key Indicators of the Labour Market (ILO-KILM) 16a database.
Figure 3: Governance Quality
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data from 2002 on because of lack of availability for the previous years. See Appendix A.1 for additional details about these indicators.
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2.2 Taxes and Social Contributions
Another factor that may have contributed to the decline in the informal economic activity, and
therefore tax evasion in Bulgaria, is the changing tax system. Here we summarize the changes in
personal and corporate income tax code and the social contribution levels over the years.9
The personal income tax schedule underwent a number of major reforms in the last 15 years.
Figure 4a depicts the average tax rate as a function of income. This tax schedule applies to the
earnings of workers in the economy. Several observations are in order. First, the top marginal tax
rate has decreased dramatically in the first part of the time period, from 40% in 2000 to 24% in
2007. This led to a decrease of the average rate for high earners. Second, in 2008 a flat tax of 10%
was introduced without any deductible amount.10
To further clarify the changes in the income tax schedule we estimate the parameters of a
popular tax function recently used by Benabou (2002), Guner et al. (2014) and Heathcote et al.
(2016) among others. The particular functional form we employ is given by t (y) = 1 − αy−τ ,
where y is taxable income relative to mean income and t(y) is the average tax rate on it. The two
parameters of the function summarize the level of the taxation at mean taxable income (1−α) and
the level of tax progressivity (τ ). The estimated 1 − α and τ for each year in the time period are
displayed in Figure 4b. The average tax rate at mean income, 1−α, has a general decreasing trend
over time but the magnitude of the change is fairly small. However, the level of progressivity τ
drops significantly with the introduction of the flat tax in 2008 and then stays constant at zero for
the rest of the period.
The rate of the proportional corporate income tax was at an all-time high in 2000 at 32.5%.
Several governments in a row implemented tax cuts by reducing this rate down to 15%. Finally, in
2008 the corporate income tax was further slashed down to 10% (see Figure 4c). This came along
with the corresponding reduction in the personal income tax to a flat rate of the same magnitude.
9An important dimension of the tax system which is left out here is the value-added tax of 20%. This rate did not
change in the period under consideration. Therefore, this indirect method of taxation is unlikely to play a role when it
comes to changes in informality and tax evasion.
10We use popular commercial accounting software to derive tax rates at a very fine grid of income which goes up to
100 times the average wage in each year for the period 2000-2014. For more details, see Appendix A.2.
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Figure 4: Personal Income and Corporate Taxes
(a) Average Personal Income Tax Rates
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(c) Corporate Income Taxes
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Notes: Tax rates for Bulgaria in 2000-2014 are derived using accounting tax calculators; see Appendix A.2. For details on the estimation of the tax
functions and the interpretation of the parameters, see Appendix A.3.
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Figure 5: Social Contribution Rates Paid by Employers and Employees
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Notes: Social contribution rates for Bulgaria in 2000-2014 are derived using accounting tax calculators; see Appendix A.2.
The last item to be discussed about the Bulgarian tax system is the social contributions paid by
employers and employees. These contributions consist of payments for unemployment, disability,
maternity, pensions and health insurance of the employees. However, they are levied on both the
employer and the employee. The time evolution of social contribution rates of employers and
employees is depicted in Figure 5. The employee’s rate varies slightly during the years, but its
general level is always around 12-13%. The employer’s contribution, however, fell sharply from
more than 35% in 2000 to less than 20% after 2008.
2.3 Wages
Figure 6 depicts the evolution of the minimum level of personal income (the legally binding min-
imum wage) for 2000-2014. For comparative proposes, we also plot the time series for average
monthly wage income for the same period. The ratio of minimum income as a fraction of average
income throughout the period oscillates in the interval 0.3-0.4. This ratio has similar values in other
Eastern European countries but is much higher in Western Europe.11 Also, we note that a third of
all employed Bulgarians receive minimum wages. This number comes for a written reply of the
finance minister to the Bulgarian parliament. Based on expert calculations, the finance minister
claims that 1,007,695 workers get minimum wages, while the overall number of employed people
11The mean of the ratio of minimum wage to average wage for full-time workers in Eastern Europe is 0.3 in 2000
and increases to 0.38 in 2014. The corresponding Western European values are 0.49 in 2000 and 0.43 in 2014. Relevant
data comes from OECD Statistics and can be found here.
12
is 3,031,900 in 2015.12
Observed average wages in Bulgaria for the period 2000-2014 are important data targets for
the estimated model presented in the next sections. At the same time the evolution of minimum
wages will be used as an input series in the model.
Figure 6: Average and Minimum Personal Income
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Notes: Average and minimum income for Bulgaria in 2000-2014 are taken from the National Statistical Institute.
3 The Model
In this section we develop an equilibrium model of informal production that incorporates the main
ingredients needed to describe tax evasion practices in Bulgaria. Then, the model is estimated on
observed time-series data and used for quantitative work and counterfactual experiments.
3.1 Economic Environment
Time is discrete and each period the economy is re-populated by a large number of one-period
lived employers with different productivity levels. Each period, an equal measure of homogeneous
workers enters the economy. Workers are randomly distributed to employers forming potentially
productive pairs which we will refer to from now on as islands. Once matched, workers cannot
relocate to a different employer.13
12Here is the link to the statements of the finance minister. The number of employed people is taken from the
National Statistical Institute and can be found here.
13This assumption reflects the low labor mobility in Bulgaria. Even though detailed firm-level is not present to back
up this assumption, the very low regional mobility (see here) and the low levels of average wages are telling measures
13
Production on each island depends on the productivity of the employer, which is given by λ, and
an aggregate productivity shock z, which hits the economy each period. In addition, workers can
either supply a unit of labor in production or be inactive in which case production is not undertaken.
Even though there might be potentially inactive workers on other islands, the employer cannot
access them. This is the central frictional element in our environment. The outside options related
to inactivity of both the worker and the employer are set to zero.14 The fact that the employer cannot
call another worker if the current one refuses to cooperate, gives rise to a production surplus which
can be shared between the two parties through bargaining.
The production when undertaken is given by the following production function,
y = zλ.
The island-specific productivity λ is distributed according to a distribution F (λ) with support
[λ,∞). We normalize the mean of distribution F to unity. Thus, if all islands are active in produc-
tion, the average island productivity in the economy is unity and the aggregate production equals
z. Employers and workers are risk-neutral and their payoffs are given by the net remuneration
from production, i.e., a wage for the worker and a profit for the employer net of personal/corporate
income taxes and social contributions. The social contributions related to a job position are paid by
both the employer and the worker via payroll taxes. In particular, if the job position is associated
with an earnings level of w, then the employer needs to contribute SE(w), while the worker pays
SW (w). These tax functions are given by SE(w) = min{sEw, S¯E} and SW (w) = min{sWw, S¯W}.
Essentially, the social contributions are proportional to the worker’s earnings but cannot exceed the
ceilings S¯E and S¯W . This formulation follows closely the observed structure of payroll taxes in
Bulgaria. Labor income net of payroll tax, w − SW (w), is subject to the personal income tax
schedule TW (·), which is increasing in the tax base, and allows for an arbitrary degree of progres-
sivity. Business income e net of social contributions SE(w) paid by the employer is taxed at a
proportional rate tE . Note that the payroll taxes SE(w) covered by the employer are deductible
from business income e.
The productive pair on each island makes decisions on wages, profits and tax evasion. We
for its validity.
14This implies that whenever employers are productive enough to pay at least the minimum wage to the workers and
secure non-negative profits for themselves, they always go for production. For simplicity, for the rest of the exposition,
we assume that islands are always active, i.e., the minimum productive capacity of employers is sufficiently high.
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assume that the production surplus is split according to a Nash-bargaining procedure. An important
institutional detail that we introduce in the model is the presence of a minimum wage, wmin. The
reported remuneration of a worker cannot fall below this threshold.
It is instructive to first describe the case in which the productive pairs are not allowed to evade
any taxes. In this case, they bargain over the net payments they would receive from production,
taking into account the taxes and social contributions levied by the government subject to the
worker’s outside option. Now think of the process of tax evasion. First, let us clarify that the
tax authorities can observe the aggregate productivity level z in the economy but do not have any
information on the island-specific productivity levels λ. Therefore, they do not observe the overall
productivity level on the island. This creates possibilities of tax evasion conducted jointly by the
employer and the employee by underreporting their production. In doing so, the productive pair
on an island needs to mimic the decision-making process in the case of no tax evasion.
Hiding production is costly. If the pair coordinates on hiding h, they incur an output loss of
κ(h). The cost function κ(·) is increasing and convex in the hidden amount. Then, the reported
production is given by yˆ = y − κ(h) − h. The forgone output due to tax evasion reflects the
resources spent on concealing the informal economic activities from the fiscal authorities.15 Our
model does not feature explicitly the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) setup where tax evaders face
a probability of being detected and, if that happens, they are subject to a fine. Since agents are risk
neutral in our model, the cost of evasion function can be interpreted as an expected punishment
incurred when underreporting income. In this sense our cost function provides a parsimonious
way to model tax enforcement and other factors (such as quality of tax administration) that affect
informality.
The decision on tax evasion is made by the employer and employee who maximize the total
surplus due to tax evasion by comparing the benefits of tax evasion in terms of forgone tax pay-
ments and its costs. In doing so, they take into account the prevailing tax structure in the economy.
In a second stage, they bargain on how to split the hidden production taking into account their
outside options which are given by the net remunerations they would receive in the case of no tax
evasion. The amount of hidden income that each employee receives is dubbed the envelope wage.
The remaining hidden amount goes to the employer as an envelope profit. Therefore, the outlined
15Hiding output from the government can be costly due to a number of reasons. Firstly, production may need to
take place at night and/or double accounting practices may be costly in terms of time. Second, tax evasion practices
may require bribing government officials.
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environment captures the prevailing practices of tax evasion in Eastern and Southern Europe.
In the rest of this section we state the decision problems in the cases of no evasion and tax
evasion faced on each island.
3.2 The Case of No Evasion
The aggregate productivity in the economy is given by z, which is a common knowledge.16 Sup-
pose that the employer and the worker on an island with productivity λ, and therefore productive
capacity y = zλ, do not hide any amount of production. Therefore, the reported production for
tax purposes is yˆ = y. The outside options for the worker and the employer are set to zero, as
explained in the previous section. The employer offers a wage according to the problem defined
below,
max
e≥0,w≥wmin
{
[(1− tE)(e− SE (w))] γ [w − SW (w)− TW (w − SW (w))]1−γ
}
(1)
subject to
e+ w = y (2)
and
(1− tE)(e− SE (w)) ≥ 0 (3)
w − SW (w)− TW (w − SW (w)) ≥ 0. (4)
The bargaining power of the employer is given by γ ∈ (0, 1). The surplus of the employer is given
by the amount of earned business income e net of payroll taxes and corporate income taxes. The
worker’s surplus equals the earnings w net of payroll and personal income taxes. The bargained
wage w is bounded below by the minimum wage that is exogenously fixed by the government.
The solution of the above problem can be summarized by the functions which define the split
of the total production,
e = e∗(y) (5)
and
w = w∗(y). (6)
In essence, functions (5) and (6) map the level of production to the income of the employer and
16The aggregate productivity z is treated as a known parameter in the decision-making process that follows.
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the worker.
We define the after-tax income levels for workers and employers in the case of no tax evasion
as
c∗E(y) = (1− tE)(e∗(y)− SE (w∗(y))) (7)
and
c∗W (y) = w
∗(y)− SW (w∗(y))− TW (w∗(y)− SW (w∗(y))). (8)
Analytical Results. It is possible to solve the decision problem with no tax evasion (1) in closed
form if we impose concrete parametric forms on the tax functions. In particular, social contri-
butions are set to be proportional as in the data. They can be written as SE (w) = sEw and
SW (w) = sWw.17 The personal income tax is given by the following functional form,
TW (y;α, τ) = y − αy1−τ , (9)
therefore, after-tax income is given by
y − TW (y) = αy1−τ ,
and the average tax rate is 1− αy−τ . This is a very flexible functional form that encompasses the
cases of proportional taxes (if τ = 0) and progressive taxes (if τ > 0).
When TW (·) is specified as in (9), problem (1) is fully tractable. If the minimum wage con-
straint is not binding, the decision rules for wages and profits (5) and (6) are given by
e∗ (y) = αe(γ, τ, sE)y (10)
and
w∗ (y) = αw(γ, τ, sE)y, (11)
where the shares of income going to the employer and the worker are
αe(sE, τ, γ) = 1− (1− γ) (1− τ)
(1 + sE) (1− τ (1− γ))
17Here we ignore the ceilings on the social contribution payments.
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and
αw(sE, τ, γ) =
(1− γ) (1− τ)
(1 + sE) (1− τ (1− γ)) .
However, if y < wmin
αw
, the minimum wage constraint binds, and the decision rules for profits and
wages (5) and (6) are modified to
e∗ (y) = y − wmin
and
w∗ (y) = wmin.
Therefore, the general decision rules for profits and wages can be written as
e∗ (y) = min {αe(sE, τ, γ)y, y − wmin} (12)
and
w∗ (y) = max {αw(sE, τ, γ)y, wmin} . (13)
The decision rules for pre-tax profits and wages (12) and (13) are shown in Figure 7.18
Figure 7: Profits and Wages Decision Rules
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What the effects of the different tax parameters on the splitting decisions for profits and wages?
The following proposition addresses this.19
18We impose the assumption that there are no inactive islands for this graphical representation.
19We abstract from the case of a binding minimum wage. In such instance, the tax parameters do not influence the
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Proposition 1. The decision rules e∗ (y) and w∗ (y) have the following properties with respect to
tax parameters:
(i) ∂e
∗
∂τ
> 0 and ∂w
∗
∂τ
< 0,
(ii) ∂e
∗
∂α
= ∂w
∗
∂α
= 0,
(iii) ∂e
∗
∂sE
> 0 and ∂w
∗
∂sE
< 0,
(iv) ∂e
∗
∂sW
= ∂w
∗
∂sW
= 0,
(v) ∂e
∗
∂tE
= ∂w
∗
∂tE
= 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
These comparative statics exercises show that whenever personal income tax progressivity is
on the rise (τ ↑), pre-tax profits go up and earnings go down. This follows from the fact that with
functional form (9), the after-tax income of the worker is given by α[(1 − sW )w]1−τ . Therefore,
upward changes in τ lead to a reduction of the marginal utility of wage w to the worker. Naturally,
the decision rules e∗ and w∗reflect that. The other important tax rate for the determination of the
income split is the rate of social contribution of employers, sE . Whenever it increases, the payoff
of the employer goes up to compensate him for the increased tax burden. At the same time, the
payoff of the worker goes down.
3.3 The Case of Tax Evasion
Now suppose that the employer-employee pair on an island with productivity λ can hide the level of
production they conduct on their island, thus evading taxation. As explained above, the technology
of tax evasion is associated with the cost κ(h) in terms of production, where h is the total hidden
income.
First, the employer and the worker need to decide on the reported level of island-specific pro-
ductivity λˆ which implies that reported production is yˆ = zλˆ. Second, they need to obey the
publicly observed splitting rule stemming from problem (1), that is, the observed business and
labor income should be given by
(eˆ, wˆ) ∈ arg max
e≥0,w≥wmin
{
[(1− tE)(e− SE (w))] γ [w − SW (w)− TW (w − SW (w))]1−γ
}
sharing rules.
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subject to (2), (3) and (4). For instance, if the total agreed reported production is yˆ, then the re-
ported employer’s income eˆ is consistent with the decision rule (5). The reported worker’s income
wˆ must be in accord with decision rule (6). Thus, the reported wages and profits are consistent
with reported production yˆ and are set according to the functions
ê = e∗(yˆ), (14)
ŵ = w∗(yˆ). (15)
Taking the resource constraint in the economy into account, the reported incomes of the employer
and the worker sum up to the total reported production net of the cost of evasion,
yˆ = y − h− κ(h) = e∗(yˆ) + w∗(yˆ).
Therefore, choosing the total hidden amount is equivalent to choosing the reported level of
production. Then, the bargaining problem amounts to making decisions about the levels of non-
reported income by each party.
The decision process in the case of tax evasion is as follows. First, the employer and the
worker determine the optimal amount of tax evasion that maximizes their joint earnings. The
hidden amount h is determined via the following optimization problem,
max
h≥0
{ŷ + h− te (ê− SE(ŵ))− SE(ŵ)− SW (ŵ)− TW (ŵ − SW (ŵ))} (16)
subject to
ŷ = y − κ (h)− h, (17)
ŷ ≥ 0,
ê = e∗ (ŷ) , (18)
ŵ = w∗ (ŷ) . (19)
Here the economic actors are mimicking other productivity types by adopting their policy rules
from the non-evasion case. Only in such a way can they remain under the radar of the tax authorities
and successfully hide output.
In a second stage, given the optimal amount of evasion h∗(y) determined above, they decide
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how to split it by solving the following problem,
max
hE ,hW
hγEh
1−γ
W
subject to
hE + hW = h
∗(y).
Essentially, they split the hidden amount in proportion to their bargaining power parameters. The
solution to the bargaining problem is given by the decision rules on hidden incomes,
h∗E(y) = γh
∗(y), (20)
and
h∗W (y) = (1− γ)h∗(y). (21)
Observe that the reported production can be expressed as
yˆ = y − κ(hE + hW )− hE − hW = eˆ+ wˆ. (22)
Then, combining (20), (21) and (22), we can redefine the reported income levels for the employer
and the worker as functions of their production capacity y,
eˆ = e∗∗(y),
and
wˆ = w∗∗(y).
Analytical Results. Using the parametric assumptions on the tax functions from the case of no
tax evasion, we can derive some analytical results here too. In addition, we assume that the cost
function κ(h) is differentiable, increasing and convex. Substituting the expression for reported
production (17) and the mimicking constraints (18)-(19) into (16), we can express the objective
function as
y − κ (h) +A(sE, τ, tE, γ)ŷ + B(sE, sW , α, τ, γ)ŷ1−τ , (23)
where
A(sE, τ, tE, γ) = −tEαe(sE, τ, γ)− sEαw(sE, τ, γ) (1− tE)− αw(sE, τ, γ) < 0
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and
B(sE, sW , α, τ, γ) = α [(1− sW )αw(sE, τ, γ)]1−τ > 0.
The optimal level of hidden production is determined by the first-order condition related to expres-
sion (23),
κ′ (h) = − [A(sE, τ, tE, γ) + B(sE, sW , α, τ, γ) (1− τ) ŷ−τ] [1 + κ′ (h)] . (24)
The left-hand side of equation (24) represents the marginal cost of hiding income and we denote it
from now on as MC(h). This curve is always increasing in the hidden amount. This reflects the
fact that if the employer-employee pair coordinate on a larger amount of evasion they have to spend
more and more resources to keep their activities hidden from the fiscal authorities. The right-hand
side is the marginal benefit of evasion which is denoted as MB(h, y; sE, sW , α, τ, tE, γ) and it
depends on all tax parameters. This curve is not necessarily increasing in the hidden amount as
shown in the next paragraphs. Employers and workers maximize their joint earnings by equating
the marginal cost of hiding income to the marginal benefit of doing so.
Equation (24) is portrayed in Figures 8a-8b. Figure 8a shows the case of the progressive in-
come tax (τ > 0) for a fixed island-specific productivity, whereas Figure 8b depicts the case of a
proportional tax (τ = 0).20 In both cases the amount of tax evasion, h, is determined by the inter-
section of the curves for the marginal cost and benefit. When taxes are progressive, the marginal
benefit curve has a positive slope for low levels of hidden income. However, for high levels of hid-
ing, the slope of the curve becomes negative. For proportional taxes the curve is always increasing
in h.
A rise in any tax rate leads to a potential increase in the marginal gain from evading one more
unit of production. In such a case hidden income h increases. This is summarized in the following
proposition:
Proposition 2. The decision rule for hidden income h∗(y) has the following properties with respect
to tax parameters,
(i) ∂h
∗
∂τ
> 0 if y > y˜, and the opposite is true if y < y˜
(ii) ∂h
∗
∂α
< 0,
20Here we use parameter values of the estimated version of the model for 2001, which will be presented in the next
sections. The case of progressive taxation (τ > 0) uses the estimated τ for 2001, while in the proportional tax case we
substitute it with τ = 0. The island-specific productivity λ is fixed at the median of the distribution F .
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Figure 8: Marginal Cost and Benefit of Evading Taxes
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(b) Proportional Personal Income tax, τ = 0
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(iii) ∂h
∗
∂sE
> 0,
(iv) ∂h
∗
∂sW
> 0,
(v) ∂h
∗
∂tE
> 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
A rise in personal income tax progressivity (τ ↑) produces more tax evasion whenever the
production capacity is sufficiently high (above the threshold y˜). If this is the case, an increase in
progressivity leads to an increase in the marginal tax rate which in turn makes tax evasion more
profitable. The other items in the proposition simply show the relationship between taxes and
hidden income.21
Interestingly, the marginal benefit MB depends positively on the level of productive efficiency
y as long as the personal income tax schedule is progressive, that is when τ > 0. The intuition
here is as follows. Workers, who operate on more productive islands or face a rise in aggregate
labor productivity z, earn higher reported wages as evident by the wage schedule (11). When
taxes are progressive, they also face higher marginal tax rates compared to their less productive
counterparts. Therefore, these workers have higher marginal benefit MB of receiving envelope
wages. However, if the personal income tax TW (·) is proportional, the marginal tax rate does not
21Keep in mind that an decrease in α implies higher average tax rates for personal income.
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depend on labor earnings but is constant and the optimality condition (24) is not affected by y,
MC (h) = MB(h; sE, sW , α, tE, γ).
Let us perform the following thought experiment: suppose that productive capacity rises from y
to y′, where y′ > y. How do the employer and the worker modify their tax evasion behavior?
The MC curve does not depend on y. The MB depends on y as long as τ > 0. If τ = 0, the
optimal h remains intact and the share of production that is concealed from the public authorities
decreases mechanically.22 If instead τ > 0, an increase in y will lead to an upward shift in the MB
schedule, hence h increases as well. In this case, the effect on the fraction of production which is
hidden, h/yˆ, is ambiguous. We can re-state the discussion above more formally in the following
proposition:
Proposition 3. An increase in productive efficiency (higher y = zλ) leads to higher concealed
income h if and only if the personal tax system is progressive (i.e. τ > 0),{
∂h∗
∂y
= 0⇐⇒ τ = 0
∂h∗
∂y
> 0⇐⇒ τ > 0 .
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
A simple comparative statics exercise is depicted in Figure 9 to illustrate Proposition 3. When
we increase productivity from y to y′, the marginal cost schedule is unaffected but the marginal
benefit curve shifts upward when taxes are progressive. Thus, the optimal level of hidden income
h∗ increases. The intuition here is that whenever marginal tax rates increase with income, tax
evasion becomes more attractive.
3.4 Aggregate Statistics
Here we report some important aggregate outcomes for the economy under investigation. These
aggregates will be analyzed in detail in the next section where we describe the quantitative imple-
mentation of the model.
The total production capacity in the economy is given by the level of the aggregate productivity
22The share of hidden income out of total production on an island is h/yˆ = h/(y − h− κ(h)). When h is constant
but y increases, then the ratio h/yˆ rises too.
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Figure 9: Comparative Statics - An Increase in Productivity (y′ > y)
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shock z because E(λ) = 1.23 That is,
Y = z. (25)
The amount of hidden production is given by
H =
ˆ
[h∗E(zλ) + h
∗
W (zλ)] dF (λ). (26)
The aggregate efficiency loss due to tax evasion is given by the costs of hiding in terms of forgone
output,
L=
ˆ
[κ(h∗E(zλ) + h
∗
W (zλ))] dF (λ). (27)
Given the aggregate hidden amount and the aggregate efficiency loss, we can compute the reported
production in the economy, i.e. the official GDP.24 It is
Yˆ = Y −H − L. (28)
We are interested in the size of the informal economy relative to reported production, which can
be readily calculated as H/Yˆ , and in the share of production pairs which are constrained at the
23We assume no island is inactive in production.
24Bulgarian tax authorities do not yet include an estimate of the undeclared production in the calculation of GDP.
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minimum wage,
S =
ˆ
1w∗∗(zλ)=wmindF (λ).
Finally, the tax revenue raised by the government is given by
T =
ˆ
[TE(e
∗∗(zλ)− SE(w∗∗(zλ))) + TW (w∗∗(zλ)− SW (w∗∗(zλ)))] dF (λ). (29)
Note that expression (29) describes a generalized Laffer curve for this economy.
4 Bringing the Model to the Data
The model admits no closed form solution when tax evasion is permitted, hence we solve and
simulate it with the help of numerical techniques. The model period is set to one year and the
simulation is performed for the time period 2000-2014. We use the schedules for taxes and social
contributions over the time period and the time series for the minimum wages as exogenous inputs
to the model. Then, we use the environment to generate time paths for several aggregate statis-
tics such as the overall size of the informal economy, the observed average monthly wages, the
observed labor productivity (measured as output per worker), the average Gini coefficient of the
observed after-tax labor income and the share of workers receiving minimum wage for the period
2000-2014. As argued later in the text, these moments are useful targets for estimating the model
parameters. We match the model outcomes to the corresponding data moments using a minimum
distance estimation strategy. Finally, we employ our quantitative environment to gauge the de-
terminants of the informal economy and its changes over time through a series of counterfactual
experiments.
Before proceeding to the details of the estimation procedure and the obtained model fit, let us
briefly discuss how the tax system is introduced to the model and what parametric assumptions are
made.
Taxes and Social Contributions. We directly use the observed tax schedules for the personal
income tax, TW (·), the corporate business tax, TE (·), the social contributions of the employer,
SE (·), and the social contributions of the employee, SW (·).25
25In the analytical part of the paper, we use a concrete functional form for the tax schedule on personal income. Here
we use the observed empirical tax schedule on personal income. The empirical difference between the two approaches
is marginal given the almost perfect fit of the functional form to the data. The description of the tax data calculations
is presented in Appendix A.2.
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Functional Forms. We choose a general functional form for the cost of evasion, with two param-
eters,
κ (h) = β exp (θh) .
The parameter β governs the level of the cost of hiding, while θ controls its curvature. The island-
specific productivity λ is assumed to follow a log-normal distribution with mean −σ2/2 and vari-
ance σ2. This implies that the mean of the of λ is unity.26
4.1 Estimation
We consider the two parameters related to the cost of hiding, β and θ, the bargaining parameter γ
(more precisely, the employer’s bargaining power), the variance σ2 of the island-specific produc-
tivity λ, and the sequence of unobserved labor productivity level, {zt}2014t=2000 for the time period
2000-2014. We estimate these 19 parameters by matching 47 data moments; see Appendix A.1 for
details. The data targets that we consider are:
1. The size of the informal economy (2000-2014) [15 targets]
2. Observed average monthly wages (2000-2014) [15 targets]
3. Observed labor productivity measured as output per worker (2000-2014) [15 targets]
4. Gini coefficient of disposable labor income and share of workers receiving minimum wage
(2000-2014 average) [2 targets].
A discussion of the parameter identification strategy is in order. It is well understood that changes
to any of the parameters considered in estimation affect the model outcomes for all of the above
moments. However, some moments are more responsive to certain parameters. Heuristically, a
moment target is informative about an unknown parameter if that target is sensitive to changes in
the parameter value.
In order to pin down the values of the parameters related to the cost of hiding (β and θ), we
match the 2000-2014 time series of the size of the informal economy. The mean of the size of the
informal economy across time is informative about the level of the cost of evasion, captured by
26We use 10 grid points to approximate the distribution of λ. The discretization procedure takes the lowest and the
highest grid points to be 5 standard deviations away from the mean of the distribution. This truncation of the discrete
distribution of λ from below is sufficient to rule out inactivity in the estimated version of the model.
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the parameter β. A higher value of β shifts down the size of the informal economy in all years.
The curvature of the cost function (θ) affects the changes in the size of the informal economy.
Therefore, θ is recovered by matching the decreasing pattern of tax evasion over time.
One advantage of our estimation strategy is that we can identify the parameters of the cost
function of hiding income without using data on the cross-section of tax evasion (which is not
available). For the time being, think of all other parameters of the model as fixed. Then, the
hidden amount of production on an island in the model can be represented as a function of the
island-specific productivity λ and the cost parameters (β, θ). We omit all other parameters that do
not change over time. Therefore, denote this function as h˜(λ, β, θ, z). The corresponding cost of
hiding is a function of the hidden amount and the parameters (β, θ), so we can also express it as
a function of the island-specific productivity and the parameters (β, θ); call it κ˜(λ, β, θ, z). Then,
the values of the two parameters (β, θ) need to be set to match a sequence of 15 targets for the
size of the informal economy. Algebraically, the parameter estimates for (β, θ) are the ones that
minimize the squared distance between the data and the model moments below,
d2000
H/Yˆ
=
´
h˜(λ, β, θ)dF (λ)
z2000 −
´
h˜(λ, β, θ)dF (λ)− ´ κ˜(λ, β, θ)dF (λ)
... = · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
... = · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
... = · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
d2014
H/Yˆ
=
´
h˜(λ, β, θ)dF (λ)
z2014 −
´
h˜(λ, β, θ)dF (λ)− ´ κ˜(λ, β, θ)dF (λ) ,
where the left-hand side variable in the individual equations denotes the observed size of the infor-
mal economy over time in the data,
{
dH/Yˆ ,t
}2014
t=2000
. The right-hand side of each equation expresses
the size of the informal economy implied by the model as a function of the cost parameters (β, θ).
Clearly, the system of equations is over-identified given that there is sufficient variation over time
of the size of the informal economy and the true productivity. In other words, our identification
strategy for the parameters of the cost function of tax evasion rely on the time-series variation of
the size of the informal economy and the observed labor productivity.
The level of observed wages for 2000-2014 is used to identify the bargaining parameter γ.
Workers remuneration consists of observed wages and unobserved envelope wages. By matching
the overall size of the informal economy, we essentially determine the sum of hidden income for
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workers and employers. Then, the bargaining parameter γ determines the split of this hidden
income between workers and employers. It also determines the levels of observed wages and
profits.
The wage inequality observed in the data helps us to identify the variance of the island-specific
productivity process, σ2. In this case, we match the 2000-2014 average of the Gini coefficient of
labor income since our model cannot capture by construction many features that affected inequal-
ity in the data (globalization, skill-biased technological change and trade shocks among others).
In addition, we match the share of workers with minimum wage. This moment is also strongly
influenced by the variance of the island-specific productivity process. Finally, our last target is the
evolution of the observed labor productivity between 2000 and 2014. This set of moments is infor-
mative about the true production capacity of the economy, before the resource cost of tax evasion
and the hidden income are taken into account. This is interesting because we use the model to
estimate a moment (true labor productivity) that cannot be observed in the data.
The parameters to be estimated are summarized in the following vector,
Θ = {β, θ, γ, σ2, {zt}2014t=2000}.
Let d represent the vector of 47 data targets. The vector mˆ(Θ) contains the analogous model
moments which are a function of the parameter vector Θ. We define the difference between the
data targets and the corresponding model moments as
gi(Θ) = di − mˆi(Θ),
for i = 1, ..., 47.
The minimum distance procedure chooses the optimal parameters in order to bring the model
as close as possible to the data. More precisely, it picks Θ to minimize the weighted sum of squared
deviations between the data and the model,
Θˆ = min
Θ
g(Θ)′W g(Θ)
where W is a positive semidefinite matrix. The estimator Θˆ is consistent for any positive semidef-
inite weighting matrix (Lee and Ingram 1991). We choose the identity matrix, i.e. W = I .
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4.2 Estimation Results
The parameter estimates are summarized in Table 1. The estimated parameters related to the
cost of evasion, β and θ, do not have an immediate economic interpretation. The estimated cost
function implies very small penalty for small hidden amounts. However, it implies much higher
levels of penalty for realistic levels of evasion and it is highly convex. It is interesting to focus on
the estimate for the employer’s bargaining power, γ. Our bargaining model obtains a good match
to the data of observed wages whenever γ takes values close to 1. Such a value implies that the
employer is able to get most of the income generated by production. This result suggests that taxes
affecting the employer’s profits are going to play a major role in determining the decision to hide
income. Taxes levied on the income of workers, on the contrary, would not matter so much for tax
evasion because wages are only a small fraction of total production.
Table 1: Parameter Estimates
Parameter Description Value
β Cost of evasion - level 0.20255·10−7
θ Cost of evasion - curvature 0.00725
γ Employer bargaining power 0.97410
σ2 Variance of productivity 0.50066
{zt}2014t=2000 Output per worker see Figure 11b
The variance of productivity distribution, σ2 is estimated to be around 0.5, while the aggregate
labor productivity is estimated to vary between 10,390 and 12,389 euros across years. The differ-
ences between the estimated (true) and observed labor productivity levels will be discussed in the
next subsection.
4.3 Model Fit
The model does a very good job in matching the declining trend of the size of the informal economy
over time in Bulgaria; see Figure 10a. It slightly overemphasizes the importance of the shadow
economy at the beginning of the sample and slightly underpredicts it for the last two years, but
these differences between the model and the data are fairly small. Figures 10b and 10c present the
the model fit in terms of average observed wages and observed labor productivity over time. Here
again the model performs well in terms of matching the trends in the data.
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Figure 10: Model Fit - Time Trends
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To better assess the model goodness of fit, we compute the time-average of the data targets
presented on Figure 10 and compare them with their model counterparts. Table 2 shows these
comparisons. It also features the additional two average data targets for the period 2000-2014,
namely the Gini coefficient of disposable income and the share of workers paid the minimum
wage. The model has no problem matching most of the aggregate targets. However, it overpredicts
income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient and underpredicts the share of workers receiv-
ing the minimum wage. Note that a reduction in the variance σ2 of the island-specific productivity
will lead to lower levels of observed wage inequality in the model. However, this reduction would
also shrink the share of workers receiving the minimum wage. Thus, the estimation procedure
finds a satisfactory fit for both of these aggregate targets which respond with different magnitude
to changes in the parameter σ2.
Table 2: Model Fit - Time-averaged Statistics
Averages (2000-2014) Data Model
Informal Economy ( % of GDP) 33.7 34.0
Observed Wages 203 198
Observed Labor Productivity 8165 8335
Gini Disposable Income 0.325 0.395
Workers at Min Wage (%) 33.0 25.6
We conclude the discussion of the model fit by presenting two interesting predictions gener-
ated by the model which are not observed in the data. First, the model generates a cross-sectional
distributions of tax evasion by the island-specific productivity. While we do not have micro data
at the individual/establishment level to corroborate such predictions, we do find useful to discuss
them in light of some additional evidence. Figure 11a plots the share of income hidden from the
government as a function of production capacity on islands in ascending order in terms of their
productivity. At the bottom of the productivity distribution, employers and workers decide to hide
a large fraction of their output, while the fraction of evaded output is negligible at the top of the
productivity distribution. More productive firms do evade taxes, however, they cannot afford to
hide a more significant fraction of their potential output because of the increasing cost. If we as-
sume that firm size and productivity are positively correlated, this finding is consistent with the
existing evidence on firm size and informality. The World Bank Enterprise Survey 2013 finds that
small and medium-size enterprises are more likely to face competition form the informal economy.
The Eurobarometer survey also confirms that employees from small and medium-size companies
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are more likely to receive part of their remuneration as envelope wages. For more details, see Ap-
pendix A.1. As an additional step to further validate the negative relationship between productivity
and informality delivered by our model, we perform a sectoral level analysis for Bulgaria. The data
confirm that sectors with lower labor productivity have higher levels of informality. We refer the
reader to Section 6 for an extensive discussion of this additional empirical analysis.
Figure 11: Model-generated Facts
(a) Hidden Output as a Share of Productive Capacity (%)
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Second, the estimated model allow us to retrieve the unobserved aggregate labor productivity
across time. We compare the unobserved versus the observed labor productivity in Figure (11b).
Both series increase over time (with the exception of the 2008-2009 period). The true production
capacity averages around 12,000 euros whereas the observed one averages around 8,800 euros.
Therefore, tax evasion implies that observed labor productivity is roughly 25% lower than its true
value.
5 Counterfactual Experiments: Productivity versus Taxes
Now we can use the estimated model economy for counterfactual analysis. We perform a set of
quantitative experiments in order to quantify the relative effects of taxes and labor productivity on
the size of the informal economy.
Shutting down Productivity Growth. In the first exercise, we keep labor productivity constant at
its 2000 value over the whole time period 2000-2014. However, we feed in the model the correct
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tax schedules and their changes over time. Figure 12a plots the evolution of the informal economy
in the baseline model and in this new counterfactual world. Therefore, we can assess how taxes
alone matter for the observed decrease in informality (solid circle line). The distance between the
two lines is due to the productivity growth over the period. Several things are worth mentioning.
First, in the baseline scenario informality drops by around 10 percentage points (from 39% to
29% of GDP), whereas it decreases by only 3.55 percentage points when only taxes are at play.
Hence, changes in taxation can account for less than a half of the change in the size of the informal
economy. Second, almost all of the decline in informality induced by taxes takes place in the first
half of the time period, between 2000 and 2007. This is not surprising, since the major tax reforms
regarding employers were implemented before 2008, as we documented in Section 2. The fact that
taxes did not have a sizable impact on informality after 2008 points out that the role of the 2008
personal income flat tax reform as a coping device against evasion was rather small.
Shutting down Tax Reforms. In the second counterfactual exercise, we keep all tax schedules at
their 2000 levels. Essentially, we let productivity growth be the only driving force behind changes
in informality. Tax reforms would not play any role because they are omitted (see Figure 12b). The
rise of labor productivity over the period can account alone for a sizable fraction of the decline in
informality. The informal size now declines from 39% to around 32% of GDP - a decrease of 7.68
percentage points; see Table 3.
Figure 12: Productivity versus Taxes
(a) Shutting down Productivity Growth
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Table 3: Productivity versus Taxes - A Decomposition
2000 2014 Change
Model 39.29 29.16 -10.13
Shutting down Productivity 39.29 35.74 -3.55
Shutting down Tax Reforms 39.29 31.61 -7.68
Digging Deeper - The Role of Different Tax Reforms. So far we have documented that tax
reforms alone account for more than a third of the decline in informality in the model (3.55 per-
centage points out of the total decline of 10.13 percentage points). How do changes in each of the
three tax schedules in the model contribute to this result? We now turn our attention to decom-
posing the overall role of taxes into individual effects of the personal income tax, the corporate
business tax, or the social security contributions.
To quantify the effect of personal income taxes more precisely, we solve the model by feeding
in only the changes of the personal income tax code, while keeping all other taxes and productivity
fixed at their 2000 levels. Figure 13a compares this counterfactual to the scenario in which all
taxes change with a fixed productivity as in Figure 12a. It is clear that changes in personal income
taxes did not play any relevant role for the decline of the size of the informal economy. Neither the
flat tax reform in 2008, nor the previous reductions in the effective marginal tax rates had a sizable
impact on tax evasion. All in all, personal income taxes account for only 0.27 percentage point
decline in informal economy size (from 39.29% to 39.02%).
We perform a similar exercise with respect to the corporate income tax. Again keep productiv-
ity constant at its 2000 levels but allow only this tax to change over time. Figure 13b presents the
comparison to the economy in which all taxes are allowed to vary. The results show that chang-
ing corporate income taxes account for all of the effect of taxes on informality (from 39.29% to
35.74%).
Due to the high bargaining power of employers in the model, most of the value added from
production accrues as profits. Therefore, taxes on profits are the most relevant factor influencing
the marginal incentive to hide production.27 What about social contributions? Since wages are
only a small fraction of total income from production, social contributions levied either on the
employer or on the worker do not change significantly the incentives to report income. The relevant
27This result hinges crucially on the estimated high value of the parameter γ which summarizes the bargaining
power of employers. We perform sensitivity analysis with respect to this parameter and find that in economies where
workers have a higher bargaining power, this result can be quantitatively less relevant. See details on that in the next
subsection.
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Figure 13: Digging Deeper - The Role of Different Tax Reforms
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(b) Corporate Income Tax
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(c) Social Contributions
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experiment is depicted on Figure 13c.
To sum up, the experiments point out that the most important driver for the decline of the
informal economy in Bulgaria is the rise in labor productivity. It alone accounts for around three
quarters of the observed decline in our model economy. Taxes play a secondary but not negligible
role. Most of this effect comes from changes to the corporate income tax.
5.1 A Path to a Cross-Country Analysis
Our model framework can be easily extended to other countries where informality happens within
formally registered enterprises which offer formal wage contracts to workers and where wages
and profits are partially hidden. As we argue in Section 1, this is the relevant case in Europe.
More generally, our model contains three features that can be utilized in a potential cross-country
comparison of the determinants of informality. First, countries can differ explicitly in the cost of
tax evasion.28 Second, the bargaining power of workers can be different. Finally, minimum wages
can differ across countries.
Here we provide an illustration of how the bargaining power of workers, which can vary across
countries depending on the specific labor market institutions, affects the importance of taxes for
generating informality. In the baseline economy estimated to Bulgaria tax reforms influence the
informal economy size mostly through the decline of corporate taxes. This result is related to the
high estimated value of the bargaining strength of employers (γ = 0.974).
To capture the labor market institutions in countries where workers have more power, we lower
gradually the value of γ from the estimated value of 0.97 down to 0.5.29 This significantly reduces
the impact of corporate taxes on informality. As mentioned before, in the baseline economy (γ =
0.974) changes in taxes account for a decline of informality of 3.55 percentage points. Personal
income taxes account for only 8% of the decline as shown on Figure 13a. We perform similar
decomposition exercises when the bargaining power of the employers takes lower values. When
γ = 0.8, changes in personal income taxes become more important and account for 19% of the
overall decline of informality attributed to taxes. Corporate taxes still account for 79% of the
28In our model setting, the cost of tax evasion captures in a parsimonious way the effectiveness of tax enforcement
and the quality of the tax administration. See Section 3.1 for a discussion about the cost of evasion function in our
model environment.
29This counterfactual exercise is to be interpreted as “What would happen in an economy which experiences the
same tax and labor productivity changes of Bulgaria but which has a different labor market structure, with stronger
labor unions?”.
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Figure 14: Power to the Workers - Sensitivity Analysis
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(b) γ = 0.5
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overall decline due to taxes (see Figure 14a). Finally, when γ = 0.5, the contribution of the
personal income taxes becomes quantitatively similar to the contribution of the corporate business
taxes. Both of these tax changes account for approximately 45% of the overall decline in the
informal economy size due to taxes. Figure 14b present the time path for informality in this set
of counterfactual experiments. Our findings suggest that the effect of personal income tax and/or
employees’ social contributions on informality is likely to be stronger in countries where workers
have more bargaining power.
6 Validating the Mechanism
We re-evaluate the results of our quantitative analysis in the light of additional empirical evidence.
To be more precise, we now test some of the implications of our quantitative analysis using data
on informality, taxes and labor productivity across countries and across sectors (in the case of
Bulgaria). If the economic mechanism described in the previous section is relevant and can be
generalized across time and levels of aggregation, one should observe that
a) across countries and over time: Countries with higher labor productivity have a lower
level of tax evasion/informality ceteris paribus. In addition, countries which experience stronger
productivity growth also have a sharper decrease in informal production.
b) across firms and/or sectors: Smaller and less productive firms are more likely to tax evade
and pay envelope wages than large firms.30 Due to lack of firm-level data, we test a similar hy-
pothesis at sectoral level using data on agriculture, manufacturing and services in Bulgaria. Our
quantitative analysis implies that sectors with lower labor productivity have higher levels of infor-
mality and tax evasion.
Validation across Countries. The analysis performed here relies on a panel dataset consisting of
30 countries for the time period 1999-2013. The measured variables of interest are the size of the
informal economy and the prevailing labor productivity measured by output per hour worked.31
Figure 15 depicts the empirical relation between labor productivity and informality with no addi-
tional controls across the countries in our sample. The correlation between the two variables is
strongly negative (-0.64), which provides a first confirmation of the role of productivity we have
documented in the model. Furthermore, the mechanism is confirmed in a set of estimated regres-
30See the cross-sectional distribution of informality implied by the model in Figure 11a.
31We use output per hour worked instead of output per worker because of better data availability.
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Figure 15: Informality and Labor Productivity across Countries, 1999-2013 Averages
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Notes: The size of the informal economy is taken from Schneider and Enste (2013). Labor productivity is measured by GDP per hour worked in
2010 USD and comes from the ILO-KILM 16a database.
sion specifications in Table 4. The correlation between the two variables of interest is significantly
negative even when we control for time effects. Moreover, specifications (3)-(4) add country fixed
effects which allows us to focus on the association between labor productivity and informality
within countries over time. The magnitude of the correlation is smaller but still highly significant
and negative.
In a next step we also include as explanatory variables, the average tax rates on labor and
capital for 15 countries in the period 1999-2007. This empirical exercise identifies the relation
between productivity and informality after controlling for differences in taxes and their evolution
over time in the same spirit as in the quantitative analysis in the previous section. Table 5 shows
the results (specifications (1)-(4)). The impact of the productivity on informality and evasion
is still negative and significant. Moreover, in all specifications the magnitude of the estimated
coefficient is larger than before (when we did not control for taxes).32 Interestingly, the elasticity
of the size of informal economy with respect to labor productivity in our quantitative model is
of smaller magnitude. Recall that observed labor productivity in Bulgaria increased around 48%
over the period 2000-2014. At the same time the reduction in informality in the model when only
productivity is present is 7.68 percentage points which is a reduction of around 20% (see Table 3).
This implies an elasticity of informal economy size with respect to productivity of around 0.405.
32The sample size here is much smaller because of the additional explanatory variables are not available for all
countries/years.
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Table 4: Informality and Labor Productivity across Countries and Over Time, 1999-2013
Dependent variable: Informality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Output per hour worked -0.719*** -0.703*** -0.670*** -0.224***
(0.124) (0.127) (0.119) (0.0627)
Country fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Time fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Number of observations 442 442 442 442
Number of countries 30 30 30 30
R2 0.416 0.427 0.364 0.676
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Informality is measured as the log of
the hidden production as a share of GDP (in %). Labor productivity is measured as GDP per hour worked in 2010 USD.
The fact that the cross-country empirical analysis also implies a large role of productivity for the
decrease in informality is reassuring. In a final set of exercises, we also control for the quality
of governance too (Table 5, specifications (5)-(6)). Results do not change dramatically relative to
the previous specifications. Note that the signs of the estimated coefficients become negative and
significant when we control for country fixed effects in specifications (4) and (6). This might be
an indication that within countries and over time taxes are set high whenever informality is on its
way down.
Validation across Sectors. Figure 16 plots the average size of informal activity and two measures
of labor productivity by the sectors for the Bulgarian economy for the period 2000-2008. The
message is clear: sectors with low productivity (such as agriculture) have high level of informality.
The opposite is true for manufacturing and services.
In Table 6, we relate informality and productivity using a panel dataset on sectoral level for
Bulgaria in 2000-2008. The three sectors are again agriculture, manufacturing and services. The
negative association between the two variable is still present and it is even stronger when we control
for sector fixed effects. Thus, the empirical exercise confirms the basic results in obtained by the
quantitative analysis in the previous section.
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Table 5: Informality and Labor Productivity across Countries and Over Time, 1999-2013
Dependent variable: Informality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Output per hour worked -0.786** -1.014*** -1.007*** -1.207*** -0.727*** -1.378***
(0.279) (0.121) (0.233) (0.116) (0.241) (0.126)
Labor tax rate 1.591 -1.416*** 1.523* -1.248*
(0.957) (0.388) (0.841) (0.599)
Capital tax rate 0.164 -0.631*** 0.304 -0.661***
(0.675) (0.151) (0.602) (0.180)
Government quality -1.757*** 0.064
(0.545) (0.0753)
Country fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes
Number of observations 131 131 126 126 102 102
Number of countries 15 15 15 15 15 15
R2 0.236 0.545 0.379 0.700 0.598 0.723
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Informality is measured as the log of
hidden production as a share of GDP (in %). Labor productivity is measured as GDP per hours worked in 2010 USD. Tax rates are taken from
Trabandt and Uhlig (2011). The index of government quality comes from the WB-WGI database.
Figure 16: Informality and Labor Productivity by Sectors, Bulgaria 2000-2008 Averages
(a) Informality
0
5
10
15
20
H
id
de
n 
am
ou
nt
 (%
 of
 gr
os
s v
alu
e a
dd
ed
)
N
at
io
na
l S
ta
tis
tic
al
 In
st
itu
te
 E
st
im
at
es
Agriculture Manufacturing Services
(b) Output per Hour Worked
0
5,
00
0
10
,0
00
15
,0
00
La
bo
r p
ro
du
ct
ivi
ty
G
DP
 p
er
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
 in
 2
01
0 
BG
N
Agriculture Manufacturing Services
(c) Output per Employee
0
2
4
6
8
10
La
bo
r p
ro
du
ct
ivi
ty
G
DP
 p
er
 h
ou
r w
or
ke
d 
in
 2
01
0 
BG
N
Agriculture Manufacturing Services
Notes: Informality in a sector is measured as the hidden production as a share of sector-level gross value added (in %). Output per worker and
output per hour worked in a sector are measured in 2010 BGN. Data comes from the National Statistical Institute. The estimated informal
economy size by sectors is much lower than the numbers of Schneider and Enste (2013).
42
Table 6: Relationship between informality and labor productivity using sector-level data, Bulgaria
2000-2008
Dependent variable: Informality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Output per worker -0.349*** -0.787**
(0.034) (0.354)
Output per hour worked -0.399*** -0.675*
(0.037) (0.356)
Sector fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Number of observations 27 27 27 27
Number of sectors 3 3 3 3
R2 0.541 0.177 0.536 0.135
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Sectors: Agriculture, Manufacturing,
and Services. Informality in a sector is measured as the log of the hidden production as a share of sector-level gross value added (in %). Output per
worker and output per hour worked in a sector are measured in 2010 BGN.
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7 Optimal Taxation
What are the optimal taxes in this economy? What we have in mind is a benevolent government
which maximizes average welfare by choosing tax schedules for personal and business income
subject to collecting at least as much revenue as in the baseline model economy. In this exercise,
we allow employers and employees to adjust their behavior with respect to hiding production in
response to the imposed tax levels. The optimal taxation exercise is performed for the year of
2014. We use the estimated true productivity for this year along with information on minimum
wages and social contributions. In addition, we impose that tax revenue should be at least as much
as in the 2014 baseline economy. Corporate taxes are proportional, while the considered personal
income tax schedules are restricted to the functional form for average tax rates, 1−αy−τ , where y
is taxable income. Essentially, the government makes a decision on the corporate income tax rate,
tE , the average tax rate for personal income, 1− α, and the level of progressivity, τ .33
People in our economy are risk-neutral and all output is consumed. Therefore, the welfare cri-
terion boils down to the level of total production.34 The government solves Ramsey-type problem
of the following type,
max
{α,τ,tE}
Yˆ +H ≡ Y − L (30)
subject to identities (25)-(28) which define the objective function, and
ˆ
[TE(e
∗∗(zλ)− SE(w∗∗(zλ))) + TW (w∗∗(zλ)− SW (w∗∗(zλ)))] dF (λ) ≥ T , (31)
with corporate taxes levied on an island of productivity λ given by
TE(e
∗∗(zλ)− SE(w∗∗(zλ))) = tE(e∗∗(zλ)− SE(w∗∗(zλ))) (32)
and personal income taxes given by
TW (w
∗∗(zλ)− SW (w∗∗(zλ))) = (w∗∗(zλ)− SW (w∗∗(zλ)))− α(w∗∗(zλ)− SW (w∗∗(zλ)))1−τ .
(33)
33Note that in the baseline economy in 2014, personal income taxes are proportional with a rate of 10%. Therefore
the implied tax function parameters are given by α = 0.9 and τ = 0.
34Inactivity of certain islands is not observed in the baseline economy. Therefore, the production capacity in this
economy is given by Y = z. In the economy with optimal taxes which will be presented soon, all islands are active
too. This implies that the production capacity with optimal taxes is also given by Y = z. Therefore, the maximization
problem over total production (Yˆ +H) implies that the lost output due to tax evasion L is minimized.
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In words, the total level of production in the economy is maximized with respect to the tax pa-
rameters {α, τ, tE}. The constraint (31) states that the tax revenue collected across all productive
islands amounts at least to the taxes raised in the baseline economy, T . The expressions (32) and
(33) introduce the parametric forms of the tax schedules. Note that when optimizing over the tax
parameters, the government faces the optimal reaction of workers and employers to taxes encoded
into the functions e∗∗(·) and w∗∗(·) for reported income from Section 3.3.
The results of the optimization exercise are summarized in Table 7. To minimize the loss of
production due to evasion the government should shift the tax burden from corporate income to
labor income. In particular, it should cut the corporate tax rate from 10% to 9%, while at the same
time it should increase the average tax rate on workers from 10% to around 29%. The informal
economy size, and thus, tax evasion is responsive to changes to the corporate tax but does not react
to changes in the personal income taxes. This is so because the bargaining power is shifted almost
entirely to the employers. As a consequence, minimizing productive efficiency due to evasion calls
for a lower corporate tax. Then, personal income tax is set to a high level in order to generate the
necessary tax revenue.
Table 7: Optimal Taxation
Baseline Optimal Taxes
Personal Income Taxes
Average Tax Rate, 1− α 0.10 0.29
Tax Progressivity, τ 0.00 -0.003
Corporate Taxes
Proportional Rate, tE 0.10 0.09
Objective Function Value 12374.85 12375.69
The optimal tax progressivity is summarized in the parameter τ = −0.003, a very mild form
of regressivity. Therefore, we can conclude that redistribution through taxing personal income
does not play any major role in shaping the optimal tax code. The personal income schedule
essentially consists of a proportional rate of 29%. Recall that around a quarter of all workers in
the baseline economy receive minimum wages. These workers are located at the lower end of
the island-specific productivity distribution. Ideally, many of these islands would have reported
wages that are even lower than the minimum if wages were not constrained from below. In this
case, hidden output would have increased even further. In this context, cutting taxes for low wage
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earners is not diminishing hidden output because the majority of these earners would not alter their
reporting behavior in the presence of redistribution. On the other hand, taxing income of workers
on more productive islands at a higher rate would increase the incentives of tax evasion.35
It is worth mentioning that the productive gains of implementing the optimal tax system are
small relative to the case of the baseline economy, as shown on last row of Table 7. This implies
that the optimal taxation economy does not differ significantly from the baseline economy in terms
of aggregate statistics.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we evaluated the relative importance of labor productivity versus income taxes and
social security contributions for tax compliance in an economy with a large degree of informal-
ity. The results from our quantitative exercise point out that informality in Bulgaria is largely
irresponsive to changes in the personal income tax, whereas a non-negligible role is played by the
corporate income tax. The main driver of the decline of informality is the rise in labor productivity,
which accounts for more than three quarters of the decline in informality during the period under
investigation.
Such findings call into question one of the main benefits argued in favor of a personal income
flat tax reform. Hall and Rabushka (1995) claim that a sizable cut of top marginal tax rates would
lead to higher tax revenues due to an increase in tax compliance. In an European setting, we find
this might not be the case.
We envision two useful ways of extending the simple framework introduced in this paper. First,
in the current analysis we abstract from life-cycle savings and pension benefits. This additional
feature would make tax evasion less attractive because avoiding social contributions would reduce
pension entitlements. We think, however, that this is not a quantitatively relevant margin for the
economy under investigation. Bulgarian pension benefits are quite limited and the retirement age is
very close to life-expectancy.36 Second, the introduction of decreasing returns to scale technology
in the model would generate a meaningful notion of firm size, and hence, would allow us to explore
35Our model does not feature a labor supply decision. If introduced, this additional feature coupled with small
income effects may also contribute to having no significant amount of progressivity in the optimal tax schedule for
personal income. It can also call for a lower optimal average tax rate.
36The average pension benefit is around 40% of the (already very low) net average wage in the 2000s. For further
details, see Adascalitei (2015).
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the relationship between tax evasion, firm size and firm-level productivity. This additional structure
would require the availability of very detailed matched employer-employee data. We leave these
extensions to future research.
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A Appendix for Online Publication
A.1 Data
Here we provide more details regarding data that we use for the stylized facts about Bulgarian
economy in Sections 1 and 2. We also supply more information regarding the data targets that we
use to estimate the model parameters (informal economy size, labor productivity, average wages
and Gini coefficient of labor income).
Informal Economy Size. Several papers by Friedrich Schneider and others provide data on the
size of the informal economy across European countries and over time (see Table A.1).
Figure 1a in the main text presents cross-country data on the size of the informal economy in 2013
from Hassan and Schneider (2016). Figure 10a plots the time series of informal economy size
for Bulgaria and it is based on the papers reported in Table A.1. We use this time series in the
quantitative analysis (see Section 4) as targets for estimating the model parameters related to the
cost of hiding income.
There are several methodologies to measure the size and extent of informal economy.37 In this
paper we use the estimates of Friedrich Schneider based on the econometric technique MIMIC
(multiple inputs multiple causes estimation).
Table A.1: Size of Informal Economy - Data Sources
Time Period Source Link
1999-2007 Schneider et al. (2010) here
2003-2013 Schneider (2013) here
2003-2015 Schneider (2015) here
Envelope Wages. One of the very few data sources on the envelope wages practice in Europe
is the Eurobarometer survey (Undeclared work in the European Union). Such a Europe-wide
survey was conducted for the first time in 2007 (Special Eurobarometer 284), and repeated in 2013
(Special Eurobarometer 402). It was ordered by the European Commission and it collected data on
undeclared work for all 27 member states (at the time) of the European Union. A link to the survey
results can be found here. The results point out that envelope wages are a widespread phenomenon
that characterize employer-employee relationships in developed countries: enterprises are formally
37See Enste and Schneider (2000) for a comprehensive review of the methodologies that have been used in the
literature of measuring informality.
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Table A.2: Degree of informality among businesses in selected Eastern European countries
Country % of firms Number of years firms operated
formally registered without formal registration
Bulgaria 96.9 0.2
Romania 95.9 0.0
Hungary 95.6 0.2
Latvia 98.7 0.0
Estonia 98.4 0.2
Lithuania 100 0.2
Poland 98.0 0.1
Notes: Data are taken from the 2013 World Bank Enterprise Survey, based on a panel of more than 125,000 firms in 139 countries. This table
shows two indicators of the degree of informality for some Eastern European countries.
registered but may pay to their employees informal compensation in cash. The share of envelope
wage earners varies from 3% in Germany and in the UK to 14% in Bulgaria. The Eurobarometer
survey and its main findings are discussed in detail by Williams (2008) and Williams (2014).
Share of Formally Registered Firms. Data on the share of formally registered firms are taken
from the 2013 World Bank Enterprise Survey that can be found here. The survey aims at measuring
the degree of informality among firms. It is based on a panel of more than 125,000 firms in 139
countries. The results from the survey are condensed in four indicators, namely:
1. Percent of firms competing against unregistered or informal firms (Bulgaria: 59,2)
2. Percent of firms formally registered when they started operations in the country (Bulgaria:
96.9)
3. Number of years firms operated without formal registration (Bulgaria: 0.2)
4. Percent of firms identifying practices in the informal economy as a major constraint (Bul-
garia: 32.9)
We report these findings also in Table A.2 for other Eastern European countries.
The 2013 World Bank Enterprise Survey also reports that the top business obstacle is competi-
tion from informal firms. The share of firms competing against informal firms is 60 percent among
smallest firms (5-19 employees) but it drops to 40 percent among largest firms (with more than 100
employees. This finding can be reviewed here.
Governance Quality. Figure 3 shows the evolution of four governance quality indices for Bulgaria
in the 2002-2014 period. These indices are constructed by the Worldwide Governance Indicators
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(WGI) project administered by the World Bank.38 The WGI reports governance indicators for over
200 countries in the period 2000–2015. Governance is defined in the following way: “Governance
consists of the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This in-
cludes the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the
government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and
the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.”
Four governance indices are available for Bulgaria:
1. Government Effectiveness: Reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality
of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of
policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment
to such policies.
2. Regulatory Quality: Reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector develop-
ment.
3. Rule of Law: Reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide
by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights,
the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.
4. Control of Corruption: Reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised
for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of
the state by elites and private interests.
These governance indicators are in units of a standard normal distribution (with a mean of zero
and a standard deviation of one) and run from approximately -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corre-
sponding to better governance.
Gini on Labor Income. The Gini coefficient of labor income is taken from Eurostat (see link
here). It is used as a data target in the estimation of the model (see Table 2) in order to identify the
variance of the island-specific productivity shocks.
Labor Productivity and Average Wages. Figure 2 shows the evolution of labor productivity in
Bulgaria between 2000 and 2014. Labor productivity is computed as GDP per employee and is
38The link to the project can be found here.
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Table A.3: Share of self-employed workers in selected Eastern European countries
Country % of self-employed
(1999-2013)
Bulgaria 13.9
Hungary 13.3
Slovak Republic 12.3
Latvia 12.7
Estonia 8.4
Lithuania 15.9
EU average 16.9
reported in real 2005 euros. The data source is the ILO-KILM database. Data on monthly average
and minimum wages (in 2005 euros) are displayed in Figure 6. The data source is the National
Statistical Institute.
Share of Self-Employed Workers. Data on the share of self-employed out of the total labor
force is retrieved from the World Bank database, available here. Table A.3 shows self-employment
shares for selected Eastern European countries averaged over the time span 1999-2013.
A.2 Taxes and Social Contributions in Bulgaria
Here we summarize the basic features of the tax and social security system in Bulgaria in the period
2000-2014. Workers pay a personal income tax on their earnings. Corporations pay corporate
income tax on declared profits. Both the employer and the employee make contributions towards
different insurance pools, and the employee receives a payout in case one of those contingencies
occurs. We use popular commercial accounting software to derive tax rates for any income level
up to around 100 times the average wage.39 The resulting dataset is used in the estimation of the
tax functions described in Appendix A.3. We discuss each of the taxes and contributions in more
detail below.
Personal Income Taxation. The Personal Income Tax is levied on an individual’s earnings. The
evolution of the income tax code can be divided into two periods: (i) progressive income tax system
(2000-2007), and (ii) proportional tax system (flat tax) from 2008 onwards.40 The levels and the
progressivity of the personal income tax schedule are depicted in Figures 4a and 4b. Table A.4
39The tax calculators we use can be found here.
40In both cases the tax is applied after employee social contributions are deducted from the gross salary.
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Figure A.1: Composition of Employee’s Contributions
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below summarizes the concrete income brackets and the corresponding tax rates of the personal
income tax for 2000-2007.
Corporate Income Taxation. Corporations pay corporate income tax on their reported profits.
The proportional rate of this tax has been decreasing from 32.5% in 2000 to 10% in 2008 and
onwards. The evolution of the corporate income tax rates is depicted in Figure 4c.
Employee Social Contributions. According to the social security legislation in Bulgaria, each
employee makes contributions towards unemployment, general (disease and maternity), old-age
pension (“first pillar” of the pension system, which is state-managed), supplementary compulsory
pension insurance (“second pillar”, also state-managed; the “third pillar” consists of voluntary
contributions to a private pension fund), and health insurance. These contributions are proportional
to the salary of the worker. Generally, they vary across years, but these changes are not significant
as shown in Figure A.1. The sum of these contributions equals the Total Contribution Payment
of the worker, which is deducted from the gross salary. If the gross salary exceeds the legislated
ceiling income for contribution purpose for the year, the contribution payments are calculated
based on that ceiling amount. The ceiling amounts vary across years. In the early 2000s, the
ceiling is around 4 times the average salary, while in the later years it goes down to around 3 times
the average salary.
It is evident that the majority of these payments are related to pensions, followed by payments for
health insurance.
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Figure A.2: Composition of Employer’s Contributions
.6 2.1 7.1 2.8 4.8 .40
.6 2.1 7.1 2.8 4.8 .40
.6 2.1 7.1 2.8 4.8 .40
.6 2.1 7.1 2.8 4.8 .40
.6 2.1 7.1 2.8 4.8 .4.1
.6 2.1 6.1 2.8 4.8 .4.1
.6 2.1 7.2 3 3.6 .4.5
1.95 2.27 10.2 3.25 3.9 .4.5
1.95 2.27 11.7 2.6 3.9 .4.5
2.45 2.1 12.35 2.1 4.2 .4.5
3 2.25 18.2 2.25 4.2 .7 .5
3 2.25 19.5 1.5 4.2 .7 .5
3 2.25 22.5 1.5 4.2 .7 .5
3 2.25 21.75 1.5 4.2 .7 .5
3 2.25 24 1.5 4.2 .7 .5
0 10 20 30 40
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
Unemployment General (Disease and Maternity) 
Pension Supplementary Compulsory Pension Insurance 
Health Insurance Employment Accidents and Occupational Diseases
Insolvency of Employer
Employer Social Contributions. Similarly, in order to abide by the social security legislation
in Bulgaria, each employer has to make contributions on the worker’s account for unemployment,
general (disease and maternity), old-age pension, supplementary compulsory pension insurance,
health insurance, employment accidents and occupational diseases, and insolvency of employer.
These contributions are also proportional to the salary of the worker. They are bound by the same
ceiling in terms of worker’s salary as the employee contributions. The composition of the social
contribution rate of employers is presented in Figure A.2.
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Table A.4: Personal Income Tax Schedule (2000-2007)
Year Income Bracket Marginal Tax Rate
(in BGN) (in % + lump-sum in BGN)
2000 0-80 0%
80.01-115 20%
115.01-380 26% + 7
380.01-1400 32% + 75.9
1400> 40% + 403.6
2001 0-100 0%
100.01-135 20%
135.01-400 26% + 7
400.01-1400 32% + 75.9
1400> 38% + 395.9
2002 0 -110 0%
110.01-140 18%
140.01-400 24% + 5.4
400.01-1000 28% + 67.8
1000> 29% + 235.8
2003 0-110 0%
110.01-150 15%
150.01-250 22% + 6
250.01-600 26% + 28
600> 29% + 119
2004 0-120 0%
120.01-150 12%
150.01-250 22% + 3.6
250.01-600 26% + 25.6
600> 29% + 116.6
2005 0 -130 0%
130.01-150 10%
150.01-250 20% + 2
250.01-600 22% + 22
600> 24% + 99
2006 0 -180 0 %
180.01-250 20 %
250.01-600 22 % +14
600> 24 % +91
2007 0-180 0%
180.01-250 20%
250.01-600 22% +14
600-> 24% +91
Notes: Income brackets are stated in nominal Bulgarian Lev (BGN).
A.3 Estimating Tax Functions of Personal Income
In order to understand the evolution of personal income taxes in Bulgaria in the 2000-2014 period,
we fit a parametric tax function on the Bulgarian tax data. The estimated parameters are displayed
in Figure 4b. The parametric tax function is specified as follows,
T (y) = y − αy1−τ , (A-1)
where T (y) are taxes paid by a worker with taxable personal income y. This tax function has been
recently used by Benabou (2002), Guner et al. (2014) and Heathcote et al. (2016). The parameter
τ governs the progressivity of the tax schedule. When τ > 0, marginal tax rates are always greater
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than average tax rates, which is the usual way to define a progressive tax system. On the other
hand, if τ = 0, then workers face a flat tax with a rate 1 − α. Negative values of the parameter τ
give rise to a regressive tax system. The parameter α reflects the average level of taxation.
Tax function (A-1) leads to the following dependency between taxable income y and disposable
(i.e. after tax) income yd,
yd = αy1−τ . (A-2)
Therefore, the following linear relation can be estimated via ordinary least squares,
log(yd) = log(α) + (1− τ) log(y). (A-3)
We estimate equation above for each year in the period 2000-2014 and report the results in
Figure 4b. We also estimate a pooled version of (A-3) on two subsamples (before 2008 and after
2008) and report the results in Table A.5. This simple tax function fits the relationship between
disposable income and taxable income remarkably well - the resulting R2 is larger than 0.99.
Table A.5: Tax Functions - Estimates
2000-2007 2008-2014
α 0.8958*** 0.9000***
(0.0011) (0.0000)
τ 0.1168*** -0.0000***
(0.0017) (0.0000)
R2 0.9975 1.0000
Notes: Standard errors (in parentheses) are below the estimates. Delta method is used to compute the standard errors from the OLS estimation.
Significance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The term 1− α measures the average tax rate at mean income, whereas τ measures
progressivity. In the 2008-2014 period the tax function achieves perfect fit by construction due to the proportional tax.
A.4 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Result (i). We have to show that
∂αw(sE, τ, γ)
∂τ
< 0,
i.e.,
∂αw(sE, τ, γ)
∂τ
=
− (1− γ) (1− τ (1− γ))− (1− γ)2 (1− τ)
(1 + sE) (1− τ (1− γ))2
< 0,
which is true for any γ ∈ (0, 1).
Results (ii)-(v) are trivial.
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Proof of Proposition 2
Result (i). From the first-order condition (24) of the tax evasion economy we can define
F (h, y; s, sW , α, τ, tE, γ) ≡ −κ′ (h)−
[A(sE, τ, tE, γ) + B(sE, sW , α, τ, γ) (1− τ) ŷ−τ] (1 + κ′ (h)) = 0.
We highlight the fact that A(sE, τ, tE, γ) and B(sE, sW , α, τ, γ) do depend upon τ , and in particu-
lar,
∂A(sE, τ, tE, γ)
∂τ
= −∂αw(sE, τ, γ)
∂τ
(1 + sE)(1− tE) > 0
since ∂αw(sE ,τ,γ)
∂τ
< 0 by Proposition 1 and sE , tE∈ (0, 1), while
∂B(sE, sW , α, τ, γ)
∂τ
< 0.
Using the implicit function theorem, we have that
∂h∗
∂τ
= − ∂F/∂τ
∂F/∂h∗
.
Since ∂F
∂h∗ < 0 by the second-order condition, the sign of the partial derivative in interest is deter-
mined by the sign of the derivative ∂F
∂τ
.41 Note that
∂F
∂τ
= − (1 + κ′ (h))
[
∂A
∂τ
+
∂B
∂τ
(1− τ) ŷ−τ − Bŷ−τ − B (1− τ) (ŷ−τ) log ŷ] .
The term in brackets in the above equation is monotonically decreasing in y. It can be shown
that there exists a threshold y˜ > 0 such that{
∂A
∂τ
+ ∂B
∂τ
(1− τ) ŷ−τ − Bŷ−τ − B (1− τ) (ŷ−τ ) log ŷ > 0 if y < y˜
∂A
∂τ
+ ∂B
∂τ
(1− τ) ŷ−τ − Bŷ−τ − B (1− τ) (ŷ−τ ) log ŷ < 0 if y > y˜ .
Therefore, we have that {
∂F
∂τ
< 0 if y < y˜
∂F
∂τ
> 0 if y > y˜
.
An increase in tax progressivity leads to higher h if income is sufficiently high. Otherwise, more
tax progressivity lowers tax evasion.
41The term ∂F∂h∗ is the second derivative of the objective function in equation (23). In the next paragraph we omit
the arguments of A(sE , τ, tE , γ) and B(sE , sW , α, τ, γ) for better readability.
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Result (ii)-(v). We have that for any of the tax parameters x ∈ {α, sE, sW , tE},
∂h
∂x
= − ∂F/∂x
∂F/∂h∗
.
Since ∂F
∂h∗ < 0 by the second-order condition, the sign of the partial derivatives in interest is
determined by the sign of the derivatives ∂F
∂x
. For result (ii), we have that
∂F
∂α
= − (1− τ) [(1− sW )αw(sE, τ, γ)]1−τ (ŷ)−τ [1 + κ′ (h)] < 0.
As for result (iii), we show that
∂F
∂sE
= − [1 + κ′ (h)]
[
∂A(sE, τ, tE, γ)
∂sE
+
∂B(sE, sW , α, τ, γ)
∂sE
(1− τ) ŷ−τ
]
.
Note that
∂A(sE, τ, tE, γ)
∂sE
< 0 and
∂B(sE, sW , α, τ, γ)
∂sE
< 0,
therefore,
∂F
∂sE
> 0.
Result (iv) can be derived by observing that
∂F
∂sW
= − [1 + κ′ (h)]
[
∂A(sE, τ, tE, γ)
∂sE
+
∂B(sE, sW , α, τ, γ)
∂sE
(1− τ) ŷ−τ
]
.
It is easy to show that
∂A(sE, τ, tE, γ)
∂sW
= 0 and
∂B(sE, sW , α, τ, γ)
∂sW
< 0.
Therefore,
∂F
∂sW
> 0.
For result (v),
∂F
∂tE
= − [1 + κ′ (h)]
[
∂A(sE, τ, tE, γ)
∂tE
+
∂B(sE, sW , α, τ, γ)
∂tE
(1− τ) ŷ−τ
]
,
with ∂B(sE ,sW ,α,τ,γ)
∂tE
= 0 and ∂A(sE ,τ,tE ,γ)
∂tE
= seαw(sE, τ, γ)− αe(sE, τ, γ) < 0, hence,
∂F
∂tE
> 0.
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Proof of Proposition 3
By the implicit function theorem,
∂h∗
∂y
= − ∂F/∂y
∂F/∂h∗
.
Notice that ∂F
∂h∗ < 0 by the second-order condition for a maximum. Therefore,
sign
(
∂h∗
∂y
)
= sign
(
∂F
∂y
)
.
If τ = 0, it follows that ∂F
∂y
= 0, so that ∂h
∗
∂y
= 0 as we have to show. If instead τ > 0, we have that
∂F
∂y
=
τ (1− τ)B(sE, sW , α, τ, γ) [1 + κ′ (h)]
(ŷ)1+τ
> 0,
which verifies ∂h
∗
∂y
> 0.
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